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1  On November 23, 2004, President Bush issued a letter requiring the Secretary of Defense and
the Director of Central Intelligence to review matters relating to Recommendation 32 and submit
their advice to him by February 23, 2005.  This review directs the examination of all aspects
including legal, funding, operational, and supporting infrastructure.
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Summary
The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that responsibility for directing and
executing paramilitary operations should be shifted from the CIA to the U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM).  The President has directed the Secretary of
Defense and Director of Central Intelligence to review this recommendation and present
their advice by February 23, 2005.1  This report will briefly describe special operations
conducted by DOD and paramilitary operations conducted by the CIA and discuss the
implications of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations.  For additional information
see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and
Issues for Congress. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.
The U.S. strategy in pursuing the war on international terrorism involves a variety
of missions conducted by military and civilian intelligence personnel characterized as
“special operations” or paramilitary operations.  The separate roles of the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are not always clearly
reflected in media accounts and at times there has been considerable operational overlap.
Proposals such as those made by the 9/11 Commission to change organizational
relationships will, however, be evaluated on the basis of separate roles and missions,
operating practices, and relevant statutory authorities.
What Are Special Operations and Paramilitary Operations? 
DOD defines special operations as “operations conducted in hostile, denied, or
politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or
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economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad
conventional force requirement.”2 
DOD defines paramilitary forces as “forces or groups distinct from the regular armed
forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training or
mission.”  In this report, the term “paramilitary operations” will be used for operations
conducted by the CIA whose officers and employees are not part of the armed forces of
the United States.  (In practice, military personnel may be temporarily assigned to the CIA
and CIA personnel may temporarily serve directly under a military commander.)  
In general, special operations are distinguishable from regular military operations by
degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and mode of employment
among other factors.  DOD special operations are frequently clandestine — designed in
such a way as to ensure concealment; they are not necessarily covert, that is, concealing
the identity of the sponsor is not a priority.  The CIA, however, conducts covert and
clandestine operations to avoid directly implicating the U.S. Government.
Roles and Mission of CIA and SOF
USSOCOM was established by Congress in the Defense Authorization Act of 1987
(PL 99-661) and codified into law as part of Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 167.
USSOCOM’s stated mission is to plan, direct and execute special operations in the
conduct of the War on Terrorism in order to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorist networks
that threaten the United States.3
The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) to
collect intelligence through human sources and to analyze and disseminate intelligence
from all sources.  It was also to “perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the National Security
Council may direct.”  This opaque phrase was, within a few months, interpreted to include
a range of covert activities such as those that had been carried out by the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II.  Although some observers long maintained
that covert actions had no statutory basis, in 1991 the National Security Act was amended
(by P.L. 102-88) to establish specific procedures for approving covert actions and for
notifying key Members of Congress.
The statutory definition of covert action (“activity or activities of the United States
Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is
intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly. . . .”) is broad and can include a wide range of clandestine efforts
— from subsidizing foreign journals and political parties to participation in what are
essentially military operations.  In the case of paramilitary operations, there is a clear
potential for overlap with activities that can be carried out by DOD.  In general, the CIA
would be designated to conduct operations that are to be wholly covert or disavowable.
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In practice, responsibilities for paramilitary operations have been assigned by the National
Security Council on a case-by-case basis.
Brief History of CIA and SOF Paramilitary Operations
CIA.  In addition to acquiring intelligence to support US military operations from
the Korean War era to Iraq today, the CIA has also worked closely alongside DOD
personnel in military operations.   On occasion it has also conducted clandestine military
operations apart from the military.  One example was the failed Bay of Pigs landing in
Cuba in 1961.  Especially important was a substantial CIA-managed effort in Laos in the
1960s and 1970s to interdict North Vietnamese resupply efforts.  The CIA was directed
to undertake this effort in large measure to avoid the onus of official U.S. military
intervention in neutral Laos.  The CIA’s paramilitary operations in  Afghanistan in 2001
have been widely described; CIA officers began infiltrating Afghanistan before the end
of September 2001 and played an active role alongside SOF in bringing down the Taliban
regime by the end of the year.  According to media reports, the CIA has also been
extensively involved in operations in Iraq  in support of military operations.4
SOF.  SOF have reportedly been involved in clandestine and covert paramilitary
operations on numerous occasions since the Vietnam War. Operations such as the
response to the TWA 847 and Achille Lauro highjackings in 1985, Panama in 1989,
Mogadishu in 1993, and the Balkans in the late 1990s have become public knowledge
over time but other operations reportedly remain classified to this day.5  SOF units such
as the Army’s Special Forces (“Green Berets”), Rangers, the Navy’s SEALs (Sea, Air,
and Land Teams) and Air Force Special Operations aviation and special tactics units have
been involved in a variety of sensitive but acknowledged military operations.  Others
outside of DOD speculate that covert paramilitary operations would probably become the
responsibility of a number of unacknowledged special operations units believed to exist
within USSOCOM.6
9/11 Report Recommendations7
Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission report states: “Lead  responsibility for
directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should
shift to the Defense Department.  There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for
training, direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the
Special Operations Command.”  The 9/11 Commission’s basis for this recommendation
appears to be both performance and cost-based.  The report states that the CIA did not
sufficiently invest in developing a robust capability to conduct paramilitary operations
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with U.S. personnel prior to 9/11, and instead relied on improperly trained proxies
(foreign personnel under contract) resulting in an unsatisfactory outcome.  The report also
states that the United States does not have the money or people to build “two separate
capabilities for carrying out secret military operations,” and suggests that we should
“concentrate responsibility and necessary legal authorities in one entity.” 
Some observers question whether procedures are in place to insure overall
coordination of effort.  Press reports concerning an alleged lack of coordination during
Afghan operations undoubtedly contributed to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation
regarding paramilitary operations.8  Although such accounts have been discounted by
some observers, the recently enacted Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
(P.L. 108-458) includes a provision (Section 1013) that  requires DOD and CIA to
develop joint procedures “to improve the coordination and deconfliction of operations that
involve elements”of the CIA and DOD.  When separate missions are underway in the
same geographical area, the CIA and DOD are required to establish procedures to reach
“mutual agreement on the tactical and strategic objectives for the region and a clear
delineation of operational responsibilities to prevent conflict and duplication of effort.”
Potential Impacts 
Diminished CIA Intelligence Capabilities.  Some observers suggest that a
capability to plan and undertake paramilitary operations is directly related to the Agency’s
responsibility to obtain intelligence from human sources.  Some individuals and groups
that supply information may also be of assistance in undertaking or supporting a
paramilitary operation.  If CIA were to have no responsibilities in this area, however,
certain types of foreign contacts might not be exploited and capabilities that have proven
important (in Afghanistan and elsewhere) might erode or disappear.9
Additional Strain on SOF.  Some question if this proposed shift in responsibility
will place additional strains on SOF who are extensively committed worldwide and are
also experiencing retention difficulties amongst senior, retirement-eligible non-
commissioned officers.  Others argue that SOF lack the experience and requisite training
to conduct covert operations.10  They suggest that if SOF do undertake covert operations
training, that it could diminish their ability to perform their traditional missions such as
hostage rescue, close-quarters combat, and weapons of mass destruction
counterproliferation operations.
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A Reduction in Flexibility.  The 9/11 Report notes the CIA’s “reputation for
agility in operations,” as well as the military’s reputation for being “methodical and
cumbersome.”11  Some experts question if DOD and SOF are capable of operating in a
more agile and flexible manner.  They contend that the CIA was able to beat SOF into
Afghanistan because they had less bureaucracy to deal with than did SOF, which
permitted them to “do things faster, cheaper, and with more flexibility than the military.”12
Some are concerned that if SOF takes over responsibility for clandestine and covert
operations that they will become less agile and perhaps more vulnerable to bureaucratic
interference from defense officials.
 
SOF Funding Authority.  Section 1208 of PL 108-375, the Ronald W. Reagan
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, permits SOF to directly pay and
equip foreign forces or groups supporting the U.S. in combating terrorism.  Although not
a recommendation in the 9/11 Commission’s report, many feel that this authority will not
only help SOF in the conduct of unconventional warfare, but could also be a crucial tool
should they become involved in covert or clandestine operations.  In Afghanistan, SOF
did not have the authority to pay and equip local forces and instead had to rely on the CIA
to “write checks” for needed arms, ammunition, and supplies. Supporters of this
legislation believe that this will provide SOF  with greater flexibility and agility when
trying to raise and maintain irregular forces and also permit them to pay for crucial
information.13
Issues for Congress
Is This Change Necessary?  Congress may choose to review past or current
paramilitary operations undertaken by the CIA and might also choose to assess the extent
of coordination between the CIA and DOD.  P.L. 108-458 requires that a report be
submitted to defense and intelligence committees by June 2005 describing procedures
established in regard to coordination and deconfliction of CIA and DOD operations.  That
report could indicate that initiatives by the executive branch have resolved all issues or
it could provide the basis for legislative action in the future.
 There are a variety of views on this possible change.  Former acting Director of
Central Intelligence John McLaughlin reportedly stated that “I think we have a perfect
marriage now of CIA and military capabilities.  CIA brings to the mix agility and speed.
Military brings lethality.”14  The military has also expressed its reservations with
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Meyers suggesting that “there is
not a lot of enthusiasm at this point for that kind of change.”15  Some suggest that the
major source of friction between the CIA and SOF — the ability to fund resistance groups
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— has been corrected by congressional action and that both organizations have since
improved their planning and coordination of operations.
CIA has not maintained a sizable paramilitary force “on the shelf.”  When directed,
it has built paramilitary capabilities by using its individuals, either U.S. or foreign, with
paramilitary experience under the management of its permanent operations personnel in
an entity known as the Special Activities Division.  The permanent staff would be
responsible for planning and for maintaining ties to former CIA officials and military
personnel and individuals (including those with special language qualifications) who
could be employed should the need arise.  Few observers doubt that there is a continuing
need for coordination between the CIA and DOD regarding paramilitary capabilities and
plans for future operations.  Furthermore, many observers believe that the CIA should
concentrate on “filling the gaps,” focusing on those types of operations that DOD is likely
to avoid.  Nevertheless, they view  this comparatively limited set of potential operations
to be a vitally important one that should not be neglected or assigned to DOD.  There may
be occasions when having to acknowledge an official U.S. role would preclude operations
that were otherwise considered vital to the national security; the CIA can provide the
deniability that would be difficult, if not impossible, for military personnel.16
What Are the Legal Considerations of this Change?  Some experts believe
that there may be legal difficulties if SOF are required to conduct covert operations.  One
issue is the legality of ordering SOF personnel to conduct covert activities that would
require them to forfeit their Geneva Convention status to retain deniability.17  In order to
operate covertly and with deniability, SOF could be required to operate without the
protection of a military uniform and identification card which affords them combatant
status under the Geneva Convention if captured.  Another issue is that covert operations
can often be contrary to international laws or the laws of war  and U.S. military personnel
are generally expected to follow these laws.18
Congressional Oversight.  Some suggest that if this recommendation is adopted,
that congressional oversight may need to be re-evaluated and perhaps modified.
Traditionally, the public text of intelligence legislation has included few provisions
regarding paramilitary operations; levels of funding and other details are included in
classified annexes which are understood to have the force of law.  The House and Senate
Intelligence Committees do have considerable influence in supporting or discouraging
particular covert actions.  In a few cases Congress has formally voted to deny funding to
ongoing covert operations. Special Forces, however, fall under the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees, and it is unclear how Congress would  handle oversight if
covert operations are shifted to SOF as well as how disputes between the intelligence and
armed services committees would be dealt with.
